Political and electoral cycles in the implementation of Bolsa Família program

Abstract

We investigate the existence of political and electoral cycles in the implementation of the Bolsa Família Program (PBF) at the municipal level. The role played by the municipal governments in PBF is fundamental as they are responsible for enrolling the families in the Federal Government’s Single Registry for Social Programs (CadÚnico) and for guaranteeing and supervising whether the criteria of the PBF are met or not by the families. As the mayor can use the PBF to benefit himself or his nominee in an election, we estimate the effect of political and electoral variables on the municipal supply of the PBF, using panel data models controlling for municipality and region-year fixed effects. Our results indicate that mayors behave strategically, increasing the Bolsa Familia’s supply in electoral periods by something between 2.0% and 141.8%, depending on the region. We find that the intensities of electoral cycles in the North, Central-West and Northeast regions are above the estimate for Brazil, while those for the Southeast and South regions are below. This result can be explained by the greater asymmetry of information as a consequence of the lower level of transparency and greater reliance on public resources in the municipalities of the North, Central West and Northeast regions. Lastly, we find that the political cycles, resulting from the party’s alignment of the mayor with the governor and president, have much less impact on the PBF than the electoral cycles.